

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday 22 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV

(Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO
Mr. R.L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSILEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. HAMID
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. IZBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. S. SERBANESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. M. ABAGIU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. S. LÖFGREN
Mr. Ulf ERICSSON
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the one hundred and first meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I should like to welcome to our midst the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like also in my turn to welcome my friend, Mr. Barrington, who is resuming work with us today. I am sure that we are all very glad to see him back.

At the end of our meeting last Wednesday I should have liked to offer a few remarks on the speeches made that day (ENDC/FV.100), but as it was already late, I hesitated to detain the Committee any longer. That is why I have asked for the floor today. I shall therefore confine myself to some observations on the development of our general debate and on the trends which have become apparent since my delegation expressed its views on the problems under discussion, and particularly on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

It seems to me that the statements which the Committee heard last Wednesday have confirmed the unanimous desire, both of the Western Delegations and of the delegations of the non-aligned countries which have spoken up to now, to attach the greatest importance to the problem of tests and to insist that its study should be given absolute priority over other issues.

This general trend was specially emphasized by the statements of the representatives of India, Ethiopia, and Sweden at the one-hundredth meeting. I do not want to hold up the work of the Committee by making too many quotations, but I cannot refrain from drawing attention to the following remark by Mr. Lall in the course of his interesting speech:

"But there is a logic of events; and the logic of events at this moment is such that it gives a clear priority to the question of a test ban".

(ENDC/FV.100, p.10)

I should also like to quote what was said on the same lines by Mr. Imru and Mrs. Myrdal at the same meeting. The representative of Ethiopia said:

"We support the contention of several delegations which have already stated that without a test ban treaty it would be difficult to foresee fruitful discussions in other fields of disarmament." (ibid., p.21)

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Mrs. Myrdal said:

"The test ban issue is clearly the primordial one for our negotiations, if for no other reason than that it is the one that can with a fair degree of safety be said to be ripe for a speedy solution."

(ibid., p.23)

But the delegations of the non-aligned countries did not confine themselves to giving the nuclear Powers platonic encouragement; they also submitted some important proposals. Mr. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic, went to the heart of the matter in his masterly statement on 18 February

(ENDC/PV, 99, p. 15), and Mr. de Melo Franco, representative of Brazil, also made a valuable contribution (ENDC/PV.98, pp. 11 et seq). I need not stress the importance of this statement by the United Arab Republic representative, since the two Western nuclear Powers have already, with considerably more ability than I could do, expressed their appreciation of the proposals put forward by Mr. Hassan. These delegations, moreover, expressed their readiness to undertake the fundamental studies which he suggested. Mr. Foster took the opportunity, in his comments on the statements of the representative of the United Arab Republic and of the representative of Brazil, to re-affirm once more, and with vigour, the flexible position of the United States Government in our negotiations and its desire to study every proposal which can ensure adequate guarantees within a general framework (ENDC/PV.100, pp.5 et seq).

I am sure that the Western nuclear Powers will examine with the same flexibility and open mind the numerous proposals which were submitted to the Conference by the representatives of India, Ethiopia and Sweden at our last meeting. For my own part, after a very thorough study of these statements, I believe that they provide us with a fairly complete list of the problems which should be examined here. If I do not dwell on each of these proposals, it is not through lack of interest but because it is perhaps as yet too early. Nevertheless, I should like to emphasize one point at this juncture: that taken as a whole the proposals put forward constitute in my opinion a vast and probably complete agenda for the resumption of work by the Nuclear Sub-Committee. Thus, after the statements which I have mentioned, the Nuclear Sub-Committee should meet on a sound basis. It would have before it new and interesting material and specific questions on which it could usefully express its views.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

All this represents the contribution made so far to the debate by the Western delegations and by those of the non-aligned countries. This contribution is, unfortunately, in contrast with the attitude of the Soviet delegation and of those of the other socialist countries. So far the Soviet delegation has only reiterated its uncompromising attitude, and it does not at present seem altogether ready to go into the problem of tests with the urgency which everyone desires.

Mr. Kuznetsov has been good enough to agree with me that one must strike while the iron is hot, and he has also recognized (ENDC/PV.98, p.41) that the iron is hot now and that conditions are favourable for an agreement. Subsequently, however, the Soviet delegation has given the impression of wishing to divert the Conference's attention from the problem of tests, either by multiplying its political attacks on the West or by submitting new proposals for which it claims priority.

In this way the Soviet delegation has taken up a great deal of the Committee's time and attention in condemning and criticizing the normal process of modernizing the western defence system, notably in regard to submarines, a process which is unfortunately a necessity for both sides so long as no disarmament treaty has been signed. I repeat "for both sides", and in this connexion I should like to quote an article from a Soviet journal "The Red Star", which, in referring to the Soviet Union's armed forces on, I believe, the 16th of this month, although I am not certain of the date, said:

"The modernization of our armed forces is now complete. It has involved radical changes, qualitative and quantitative, in the structure of the Red Army. A Soviet armoured division now possesses a greater number of tanks than a similar division in any NATO country. The principal forces of the Soviet Navy are now made up of atomic submarines equipped with missiles."

This is therefore a process which unfortunately neither of the two sides can escape unless we sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament without delay.

Furthermore, at the last meeting the Soviet delegation again took the initiative and submitted to the Conference a draft non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/77). I should like in the first place to make a general observation in this connexion. If NATO were inherently as aggressive as Mr. Kuznetsov and Mr. Tarabanov asserted last Wednesday, would it not be rather

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

naive to propose a non-aggression pact ? Can the leopard change his spots, and would there not be a danger that in signing a non-aggression pact we should simply be a wolf in sheep's clothing ? If the Soviet Union proposes that we draft a solemn declaration to the effect that the two alliances have no aggressive aims, is it not because it already knows that the Western countries have no aggressive designs against anyone, and that they place the desire for peace with security above everything else ? For my own part, I am always willing that greater stress should be put on this desire.

In this connexion I should like, if I may, to quote the words of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the beginning of this Conference on 16 March last:

"We wish to assure those peoples who differ from us in their concept of life that we, who belong to an ancient and great civilization that finds inspiration in the principles of freedom, harbour no plan, no desire, to interfere in any manner whatsoever with their peaceful development and progress..." (ENDC/PV.3, p.14)

These statements of ours are still valid, and hence we have no hesitation in saying that we appreciate and can even understand the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact. This proposal merely repeats the principles of the United Nations Charter, to which the West is committed and remains faithful.

However, as I have already said, my delegation naturally views favourably any gesture which will emphasize our desire for peace, and I trust also that of our neighbours of the East, provided that an appropriate framework is chosen and that it in no way prejudices the solution of certain delicate problems which do not fall within this Conference's competence. Our principal problem now at Geneva is the conclusion of an agreement to ban nuclear tests, which the great majority of delegations regard as feasible and as a prerequisite for any progress by our Conference. Reverting once again to Mr. Lall's words last Wednesday (ENDC/PV.100, p.10), I would add that it would be regrettable if the impression were involuntarily created that there is a tendency to shelve the question of tests.

Those are the reasons which make me feel uncertain about the procedure proposed by you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as USSR representative rather than as co-Chairman. I say that I feel uncertain because I am not sure that I have understood your thought correctly. You said:

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

"... we suggest that, after the completion of the exchange of views in plenary meetings on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the Committee's attention should be concentrated on the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons and on the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty." (ibid., p.41)

You said: "... after the completion of the exchange of views in plenary meetings on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests..." If I am not mistaken, we are now involved in a general debate. My delegation suggested at the outset that we should start immediately with an examination of the problem of tests, but this proposal was not adopted and we began with a general debate. Naturally, as the problem of tests is the main preoccupation of most of the delegations, a large part of the speeches has been devoted to the problem of the prohibition of tests.

Nevertheless, the Committee is now engaged in a general debate. Are you proposing, Mr. Chairman, that once this debate is ended we should concentrate on the examination of the problem of tests in plenary session? If that is your intention, I agree with you. But I should not be in agreement if on the contrary you were thinking of abandoning the question of tests in order to pass on to the study of the Soviet proposals. I should not agree with you for the reasons which have been mentioned by the United States (ibid., p.50) and United Kingdom (ibid., p.48) representatives, and particularly for the following reason. We should not divert our attention from the problem of tests and direct it to other matters, however important, as long as there is any hope -- and such a hope exists -- of reaching agreement, or at least of bringing the positions closer together with regard to tests. Let it be tests and tests only, so long as there is any glimmer of hope, and specially after the speeches of the delegations of the non-aligned countries, which have provided us, as I have already said, with new material of practical importance which we should thoroughly investigate.

I believe that delegations are allowed to submit proposals to the co-Chairmen on matters of procedure. I would make the following proposal for the immediate future: first, that the Nuclear Sub-Committee should meet as soon as possible, and if feasible during the present week; secondly, that it should draw up a list

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of questions which have been put here by the various delegations and that this should form the basis of its work; thirdly, that it should submit a report to the Conference forthwith and that this report should be discussed in plenary session without delay. Is that too much to hope for? Is it too much to ask the nuclear Powers to resume work on a question of such urgency and importance? I cannot believe that it is. It is the duty of all of us now to make every possible effort regarding the problem of tests.

I should not like to end my speech without once again expressing my thanks to those who by their proposals have given a new impetus to our negotiations on tests during the present session.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I should like to take this opportunity to express my satisfaction that Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma, is back among us. My delegation hopes that his participation in our Committee's work will contribute substantially to its progress.

Throughout our discussions, and again today in the statement by the representative of Italy, we have heard our Western colleagues complaining that the socialist delegations are introducing an element of acrimony or controversy into the discussions by bringing up recent facts or incidents in international political life, whereas to reach an understanding on the important issues on the Conference's agenda -- such as general and complete disarmament, and particularly the discontinuance of nuclear tests -- it would only be necessary to take advantage of the favourable atmosphere which has existed for some time. In short, we are advised not to allow ourselves to be distracted from our subject by events which are extraneous to our Conference and by the development of the international situation, and attempts are made to reassure us.

Some Western representatives have even asserted that there is an inconsistency between the statement that the present moment would be propitious for the solution of the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests and the claim that the recent activities of certain Western Powers and in particular the United States, tending to speed up the armaments race, are an obstacle to fruitful work by the Conference.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

At our meeting on 18 February the representative of Italy complained (ENDC/PV.99, p.32) that the representatives of the socialist countries, by referring to and commenting on the activities of the NATO countries, were introducing factors calculated to throw doubt on the good faith and the desire of the Western countries to obtain results, and particularly to reach an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The United States representative, referring in his turn to the comments made by the socialist delegations concerning the most recent steps taken by the Western Powers to speed up the nuclear armaments race, stated at the same meeting (*ibid.*, p.33) that the purpose of those comments was to distract the Conference from its most important tasks and in particular from the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

We have asserted and we continue to assert, as other speakers have done, that present conditions are propitious for the solution of the nuclear tests issue and other disarmament or related problems. This atmosphere favourable to the settlement of outstanding controversial questions is, as has been emphasized on several occasions, the result of the satisfactory solution reached in the Caribbean crisis, thanks to the Soviet Government's realistic attitude and the important concessions it has made with regard to the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

But the actions of the Western Powers, such as the conclusion of the Nassau agreements, the steps taken to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force, and the resumption of underground nuclear tests by the United States, are not of a nature to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the solution of the problems which our Conference has to settle, and in particular that of the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

It was not because the United States was anxious to secure the discontinuance of nuclear tests that it carried out once again yesterday, according to today's newspapers, two underground nuclear tests in Nevada. We are informed today - and this merely as a minor news item - that the United States has carried out two nuclear tests. At the same time the representative of Italy told us today that the attitude of the Western nuclear Powers was very flexible. How is it flexible? In the daily continuation of nuclear tests, which they insist on treating as minor news items? If that is the flexibility of the Western nuclear Powers, we shall never see the discontinuance of nuclear tests until this series and the others which they are planning are finished.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

To ignore these incidents which are taking place daily and these activities of the Western Powers, to close one's eyes to them, would serve no useful purpose as far as our Conference's work is concerned. The Conference has to solve the problems raised by the development of the situation itself. In seeking a solution to these problems, it cannot ignore or stand aloof from those developments, and in particular the activities of the Western Powers which are creating fresh obstacles and running counter to the efforts made at our Conference to reach an agreement on the problems at issue.

All the representatives from other than NATO countries have signified, in one way or another, their disapproval of the resumption of underground tests by the United States, and have expressed the hope that the test carried out by the United States on 8 February will prove to be the last. But unfortunately the series of tests started by the United States is continuing. The other day the representative of the United Arab Republic said:

"We had hoped... that the United States Government would continue to honour its voluntary suspension of underground tests" (ENDC/PV.99,p.12) a suspension decided upon at the opening of the informal talks between the nuclear great Powers.

Later he went on:

"... the test carried out by the United States in Nevada on 8 February 1963 unfortunately constitutes the first such test to be conducted despite the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) ..." (ibid.) As we see, other tests are now being conducted by the United States in Nevada in defiance of resolution 1762 A; and the representative of the United Arab Republic described the action of the United States as "regrettable" and "intended mainly for political considerations..." (ibid.)

We fully agree with the representative of the United Arab Republic that that action was not only regrettable but was bound to have unfortunate repercussions on our Conference's work. It is not mere chance that the concessions recently made by the Soviet Union with regard to the discontinuance of nuclear tests have not been matched by or received the welcome they deserved

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from the Western nuclear Powers. On the contrary, that is yet another indication of the intransigent attitude of the Western Powers on this question.

In his statement on 18 February the United States representative asserted that the comments made by the representatives of the socialist countries, including the reference to the measures taken by the Western Powers, would only "delay us in coming to grips with the problems" and "distract us from our more important tasks." (ibid., p.18)

That, in our view, is a completely gratuitous assertion. It is made solely for the purpose of glossing over the responsibilities which the Western Powers are assuming in taking measures intended to speed up the armaments race.

Drawing attention to and describing these measures and actions of the Western Governments is not what will hold up or impede the progress of our Conference's work. On the contrary, to warn the Conference of these acts is to confront all those who commit them with their responsibilities, to warn them that they will bear the entire responsibility for them before the world. It is precisely with a view to improving the atmosphere in which the Conference's work is being conducted that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have drawn attention to the dangerous developments on the international scene, which arise from the machinations of the Western Powers to which I have just referred. It is also with the object of eliminating the danger which such acts and developments represent for all peoples and for the progress of our Conference, and in particular the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to which fresh impetus is being given by the efforts to establish a NATO multilateral nuclear force, that the Soviet Union has proposed the adoption of the declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75).

The adoption of the draft declaration submitted by the Soviet Union is all the more urgent because efforts are being made to represent the measures taken by the Western Powers - the only effect of which is to speed up the armaments race, and especially the nuclear armaments race - as harmless measures which will have no detrimental effect on the development of the international situation.

The representative of Italy today described them as constituting a

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modernization of the Western defences. We shall perhaps have occasion a little later in our discussion to refer to this modernization.

Some Western representatives have endeavoured to prove in their statements that the establishment of a NATO multilateral force would change nothing whatsoever in the present situation, would in no way contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, would not create any danger to peace and security. The misgivings which have been expressed in various countries, the reactions which are beginning to be observed in government circles as well as in world opinion, already constitute definite evidence that these plans, if they are carried out, will seriously threaten peace.

It is well known indeed that quite recently, with a view to the implementation of these plans, the United States has begun consultations with various governments and has sought sites for bases - especially in the Mediterranean, it seems - from which submarines equipped with Polaris rockets with nuclear warheads could operate. In this connexion it has been said that they would try to establish bases for submarines equipped with Polaris rockets in the ports of certain Mediterranean countries which are members of NATO. There were immediate reactions in those countries. Moreover, in the American and international press the story is being spread that no negotiations for an agreement concerning the use of an Italian base for American submarines equipped with Polaris rockets can take place before the legislative elections in Italy. It is also indicated in the international press that other bases will be considered if the Italian Government does not give its consent - as we hope it never will - to the stationing of these submarines in an Italian port.

The reaction in Italy to the new United States plan, and the official denials of the Italian Government, are indeed additional proof - if proof were needed - that the intention of certain Western countries to establish mobile nuclear platforms permanently in the Mediterranean directed against the socialist countries and all the other peace-loving countries of that region constitutes a tremendous danger to the peace and security of that region.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Like all the other countries in the immediate vicinity of the Mediterranean, our country views with particular concern these plans aimed at converting the Mediterranean into a base for strategic nuclear weapons. The Bulgarian people, in common with all the other nations in the vicinity of the Mediterranean, is most anxious that the entire region should be converted into an area free of nuclear weapons and rockets.

Furthermore, the Western representatives have argued that the establishment of a NATO multilateral force would not lead to a proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that on the contrary its purpose is to prevent such proliferation. But it is obvious that not only the Western nuclear Powers but all the other members of NATO will participate in decisions concerning the use of the multilateral nuclear force. The way in which decisions on the use of this force will be taken has perhaps not yet been defined. As the English newspaper The Observer rightly stated on 17 February (page 10): "On this essential point President Kennedy's grand design was left vague." But in any case this decision will be taken with the participation of the non-nuclear Powers in NATO. This fact in itself implies not merely the possible but the actual proliferation of nuclear weapons. For what is the use of giving the non-nuclear members of NATO the right to participate in this multilateral force if they are to have no say in its use? Moreover, it is certainly not the possession of nuclear weapons which is most important, but rather the power and above all the will to use them.

In regard to the possibility of using nuclear weapons, we must not overlook the agreement signed between France and Western Germany and the opportunities that it affords for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. West Germany, the heir to the militarist tradition of pre-war Germany and of Hitler's Germany too, is making tremendous efforts to equip its army with nuclear weapons.

Some speakers have taken it upon themselves to award, so to speak, a certificate of good conduct to the Federal Republic of Germany. In his statement on 18 February Mr. Foster, the United States representative said:

"The Federal Republic of Germany is now a peaceful democracy."

(ENDC/PV.99,p.34)

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He added that by the treaty of 1954 it had renounced nuclear weapons completely. However, the efforts of the militarists and leaders of West Germany to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons are well known. For a long time past West German statesmen have been saying that they would not be able to send their soldiers into a war against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries if they did not have nuclear weapons. In the notorious memorandum of the Bundeswehr generals of 1960, the Führungsstab of the Bundeswehr declared:

(Continued in English)

"The soldiers of the Bundeswehr have the right to weapons which are at least equal to those of their opponents. Their responsibility to the soldiers put into their trust requires Bundeswehr unit leaders to demand nuclear armament, which has become indispensable to the shield forces."

(Continued in French)

Still more recently, at an election meeting in August 1961, Chancellor Adenauer said:

"As Chancellor of the Federal Republic, I would never have sent German soldiers not equipped with nuclear weapons against an enemy which was equipped with such weapons."

Only yesterday the New York Times quoted statements made by von Hassel, the new West German Minister of War:

(Continued in English)

"... he stressed the German demand for Pershing missiles, whose 400-mile range places them somewhere between tactical and strategic weapons".

(Continued in French)

Now that the way to the equipment of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons has been freed of impediments by the agreements between France and West Germany and by the plans for a multilateral force in which West Germany's views will count for a great deal, the Bundeswehr generals will be able to equip their units with nuclear weapons, their dream from the outset. These plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral force, the search for new bases for American nuclear weapons, and the opportunities which the new agreements concluded between France and

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West Germany provide for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, are developments which cannot fail to cause concern among the public and create an atmosphere of fear and distrust among the nations. Not only is such an atmosphere unpropitious, but it constitutes an obstacle to any tangible progress in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. That is why steps must be taken to nip these plans in the bud in order to allay the anxieties of the peoples.

The declaration proposed by the Soviet Union on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) meets this urgent need, and can also exercise a very great influence in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Representing a country which is deeply concerned that there should be no mobile nuclear bases whether afloat or at anchor in the Mediterranean, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is in favour of the earliest possible discussion and immediate adoption of the measures contemplated in the Soviet draft declaration.

In the last few days we have heard repeated statements by the Western delegations on the flexibility of their position towards a nuclear test ban. This morning we have heard yet another speaker, the representative of Italy, vouching for the flexibility of the Western nuclear Powers. However, during the discussion it became clear that in actual fact it was only a question of assertions of good intention unsupported by acts. But assertions alone would not be sufficient to convince us of the flexibility of the position of the Western Powers on this important question. While waiting for them to take action to match the latest concessions made by the Soviet Union on the discontinuance of nuclear tests - while waiting above all for Mr. Foster, the head of the United States delegation, to return and to prove by acts and new proposals the flexibility of the Western position towards nuclear tests - we might perhaps spend our time in an urgent and thorough discussion with a view to the adoption of the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

I would point out that we are not in favour of referring this question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests to the three-Power Sub-Committee. Perhaps we could now deal with the other questions, and resume the discussion when Mr. Foster returns. This is a question of procedure which must be settled here in plenary meeting and not referred to the Sub-Committee. In this way the Conference would be doing useful work which would create much more favourable conditions for the solution of the other problems on our Committee's agenda, including that of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, the prompt and final solution of which depends solely on the good will of the Western nuclear Powers are on a change of attitude by the United States Government in keeping with the declarations and statements it has made concerning its intention to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty.

Another question to which I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee is the specific proposal made by the Soviet representative in his statement on 20 February (ENDC/PV.100, p. 36) that a non-aggression pact should be concluded between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77). Such a non-aggression pact would undoubtedly be of very great importance in improving the international situation, and would create really favourable conditions for the discussion and solution of disarmament problems, particularly as the States which are members of these alliances have the strongest military forces and the most modern armaments.

I would remind you that when the Soviet Government first made this proposal on 10 January 1958, the People's Republic of Bulgaria immediately supported it. A declaration unanimously adopted by the Bulgarian National Assembly states "Such an agreement would fully correspond to the interests of European peoples and contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and the world".

Attempts were made by certain Western countries, and in particular by the United States representative, on the very day when this proposal was introduced by the Soviet representative, to deny the usefulness of a discussion of this question at our Conference. We do not wish to dwell on the various arguments

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advanced by the United States representative. We shall state our views on them when this question appears on our agenda.

We should like to point out, however, that all the States members of the Committee, whether non-aligned or belonging to the above-mentioned military groups, as well as every other country in the world, are very much interested in the negotiation and conclusion of such a pact. Several representatives of the non-aligned countries have already drawn attention to the significance of the conclusion of such a non-aggression pact between the two great military blocs. At the same time they have emphasized the great importance and favourable influence that such an agreement would have on our Conference's work and on the solution of the various problems on its agenda, particularly as regards a favourable outcome to our main task - the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is of the opinion that this question, the importance of which is obvious to everyone, even to those who have sought to deny the usefulness of discussing it at our Conference, should be thoroughly debated as soon as possible and should be unanimously supported by all the members of our Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As the representative of the Soviet Union, I wish to set forth some considerations on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In the first place, I should like to say that we have listened with interest to the substantive statement made by the representative of Bulgaria. As for the statement of the representative of Italy, as was to be expected he continued to sing in tune with the United States, both on the question of nuclear weapon tests and on other questions which the Committee is discussing. This position of the representative of Italy is unlikely, of course, to help forward the solution of the important problems before us.

In the statements of many representatives which we have heard during the debate there was a feeling of concern about the situation of the problem of prohibiting nuclear tests. We share these apprehensions. In spite of the

(The Chairman, USSR)

constructive steps taken recently by the Soviet Government with a view to eliminating all the remaining difficulties which prevent us from reaching agreement, we unfortunately cannot speak of any real progress in the negotiations. On the contrary, there are reasons to fear, as some representatives have rightly pointed out, that the favourable opportunity for reaching agreement may be lost.

The Soviet Union has consistently advocated and is still advocating the conclusion of an agreement which would put an end to all experimental explosions of nuclear weapons. I shall recall the main steps taken in this direction by the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Union was one of the initiators of the preparation of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. The well-known Soviet Union proposals on disarmament of 10 May 1955 (DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2) included the cessation of tests as a priority measure. That was eight years ago. Incidentally, the Western Powers for a long time refused altogether to enter into negotiations on this question.

The Soviet Union agreed to take as a basis for the preparation of an agreement the recommendations drafted in 1958 by the Geneva conference of experts (EXP/NUC/28), and at the beginning of the negotiations submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of tests (GEN/NT/1). Nevertheless, the possibility of an agreement was destroyed by the stubborn attempts of the Western Powers to impose their excessive demands for control and to remain free to continue to test nuclear weapons underground.

In an attempt to get the negotiations out of the deadlock, and taking into account the advances made in science and technology, the Soviet Union proposed in November 1961 the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of all tests with the use of national means of detection for control (GEN/DTN/110; ENDC/11). The Western Powers met this proposal with bristling hostility. This was done at a time when the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, in a joint statement dated 3 September 1961 (GEN/DNT/120), admitted the possibility and adequacy of using national means of control over the cessation of tests in three environments: in

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the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Our Western partners in the negotiations would do well to read over now the statements they made when, literally on the eve of the statement by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, they were zealously trying to prove that science did not make it possible to exercise control over these types of tests by the use of national means alone.

Subsequently, faced with the need to agree to the use of national means of control over the cessation of tests in these three environments, the Western Powers now want to make their bargaining point the cessation of tests underground, and are trying in fact under the guise of control to obtain what they could not achieve in earlier negotiations.

In this connexion we deem it necessary to state briefly the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the prohibition of tests, and to indicate the main points of our differences with the Western Powers. At the same time, this will be an answer to the questions raised here during the debate by the representatives of the non-aligned States. The Soviet delegation greatly appreciates the desire of these States in the Committee to make their contribution towards resolving the difficulties still standing in the way of an agreement. Some interesting remarks on this score have been made by the representatives of Brazil, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, India, Mexico and Sweden.

National means alone ensure effective control over all types of tests.

The Western Powers are trying to minimize the significance for control purposes of the national means at the disposal of the nuclear Powers and, as Mrs. Myrdal, the Swedish representative, reminded us at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.100, pp.26 et seq), at the disposal of many non-nuclear States. We should like to draw attention to national means of control and to stress that States now have sufficiently effective instruments and sufficiently well-organised control services to be able to rely on them completely.

An extensive, practically world-wide network, formed by the combined national systems of various States, is already exercising de facto control over nuclear tests. Is not the efficiency of this control shown by the detection of the

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French underground explosion in the Sahara in May 1962, and by the detection in February 1962 of an underground explosion in the Soviet Union, which had deliberately not been announced in order to demonstrate the insincerity of those who asserted that nuclear explosions could not be identified by national means of detection? Moreover, it is not out of place to recall the embarrassment caused to the organizers of an underground nuclear explosion in the State of New Mexico on 10 December 1961. This test was intended to prove the possibility of concealment, but was recorded in many countries far distant from the United States - in Sweden, Japan, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and others.

All these facts and the practical experience of recent years have led to the natural and logical conclusion that, in order to exercise control over the observance of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, there is no need to set up a special system with international posts, inspection and other elements. It is quite enough to use what States already have. A number of statements have been made in this regard. I shall confine myself to quoting two of them.

Dr. Don Leet, the leading seismologist at Harvard University, said the following in an interview on 2 February 1963:

"There are no technical obstacles to the conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prohibition of nuclear tests."

Then Dr. Leet added:

"There is no need for on-site inspections."

This was said by a most experienced, highly-authoritative specialist in seismology, renowned far beyond the boundaries of the United States; and his conclusion is confirmed by other sources.

Not long before the resumption of the Committee's work the New York Times writer, John Finney, who specializes in disarmament and nuclear weapon test matters, wrote:

(The Chairman, USSR)

"Official representatives believe that, due to improvements in detection methods, the United States can fully rely on its own stations outside Soviet territory leaders for the purpose of control over clandestine underground explosions."

Mr. Finney went on to say:

"Some of these stations are already working in conditions of strict secrecy."

It is well known that several dozen such United States stations are situated in the territories of States bordering on the Soviet Union, and that even representatives of those States have no right of access to them.

In short, no one who is unprejudiced can fail to admit that States have at their disposal enough scientific and practical data to prove that compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of tests in all environments, including underground tests, can be successfully controlled by the national means of detection which States have at their disposal. This is a very important, one might even say a decisive, situation, to which the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to draw the attention of members of the Committee.

In this connexion it should also be borne in mind that at the most recent session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the majority of the States Members of this international Organization expressed their support of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/28), which, as we know, proposes that in carrying out control over the cessation of tests we should rely on existing, that is national means of detection. By a majority of votes the General Assembly approved this memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a basis for agreement. The Assembly went even further and recommended that, whether or not an agreement was concluded, all nuclear weapon tests should cease as from 1 January 1963 (A/RES/1762 (XVII)-ENDC/63).

We are unfortunately compelled to note, however, that, owing to the position of the United States, there is neither an agreement nor a cessation of nuclear tests. Nuclear explosions are thundering in the State of Nevada. Although the nuclear bombs are being exploded underground, the waves from these explosions are spread all over the globe, threatening the world with a new round of competitions in carrying out tests.

(The Chairman, USSR)

The number of on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations is not a subject for bargaining.

The Western Powers are trying to justify the delay in concluding an agreement by alleging that it is due to lack of agreement on an international control system. Here in the Committee the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have expressed the view that the main element of a system of control over the cessation of tests is on-site inspection. Inspection is represented as a panacea for all imaginable and unimaginable ills, and at the same time the significance of national means of control is deliberately minimized.

Since it is quite evident that no special international control is needed in order to conclude an agreement, we naturally cannot help thinking that hidden behind the demands for international on-site inspection are attempts to achieve some other purpose having nothing to do with the task of keeping watch on the cessation of tests. Another legitimate question which arises is whether these demands are not being made for the purpose of frustrating an agreement. After all, the United States has in the past put forward the question of control as a convenient means of closing the door to an agreement. It has expended considerable efforts and vast sums on finding a "scientific" justification of the need for on-site inspections in all cases. The United States has placed on this conference-table a number of reports which claim to be highly scientific. In this connexion we might mention the "new seismic data" (GEN/DNT/TWG.2/9; GEN/DNT/25), the Berkner report, (GEN/DNT/65), and the "Vela" project (ENDC/45). These reports have different titles and different prefaces, but the trend and intentions are the same: to select, or rather to arrange, such data and conclusions as confirm the official political line concerning the need for on-site inspection. Everything else, whether the views of United States scientists or the conclusions of scientists of other countries, which have run counter to this line have been ignored or simply cast aside. If the facts militated against this thesis, then according to the advocates of on-site inspection it was just so much the worst for the facts.

(The Chairman, USSR)

I repeat, it is perfectly clear to us what the motives are behind this stubbornness of the Western Powers in regard to on-site inspection and other international elements of control. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, with the sole object of speeding up the achievement of agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, decided to meet the Western Powers and to make an important political concession. The Soviet Government agreed that control over the implementation of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, based on the national means of States, should include the following three important international elements:

1. Two to three on-site inspections a year on the territory of each nuclear Power.
2. The installation of three automatic seismic stations on the territory of each nuclear Power. The stations may also be situated on the territories of non-nuclear States, naturally with the consent of their governments (ENDC/73).
3. The establishment of an international commission of scientists, as proposed by the eight non-aligned States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

In agreeing to the quota of two to three inspections a year and to the installation of three automatic seismic stations on the territory of each nuclear Power, the Soviet Government was not making a routine concession in the process of bargaining, as some representatives have tried, and are still trying, to make out in this Committee. No; in actual fact we agreed to something which, in view of the efficiency of national systems for detecting nuclear explosions, is superfluous and unnecessary for control over a treaty. But a compromise is a compromise, and it is not always the most rational solution when one of the sides in the negotiations is deliberately trying to pile up obstacles.

The figure of two to three inspections a year on the territory of each nuclear Power which we have proposed, like the figures named by the Western Powers, is of course the result of a political solution. It should be borne in mind that the principle of an inspection quota was put forward by the Western Powers

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themselves as a way of settling differences. This proposal was first made by Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, when he visited Moscow in February 1959. Moreover, the United Kingdom has regarded this approach as a purely political one from the outset.

As for the actual figure of two to three inspections a year, it is not a chance one. Before the Soviet Government decided to put it forward, the representatives of the Western Powers had given us to understand that that figure would suit them completely. During the present debate the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov, and the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassam, recalled statements by the United Kingdom delegation to the effect that if the Soviet Union were to return to its proposal for an inspection quota -- and everyone knows that we proposed three inspections a year, -- then agreement could be reached immediately. Furthermore, in private talks the United States representatives mentioned to us the figure of two to four inspections a year, which would fully satisfy the United States. Having weighed up all these statements by the representatives of the Western Powers statements, which, I would stress, were made through different channels -- the Soviet Government decided to put forward its new proposals.

These proposals were set forth in the letter from Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to the President of the United States, dated 19 December 1962 (ENDC/13).

After that concession on our part it might have been expected that the preparation of a final agreement would be a matter of days, if the other side sincerely wished to settle the question. With that in mind, the Soviet Government accepted the proposal of the United States of America to hold negotiations in New York and in this connexion to postpone the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. During the negotiations in New York and Washington we did everything in our power to achieve positive results. Considering that, as a result of the steps taken by the Soviet Union, agreement had in fact been reached on the basic question of the inspection quota, the Soviet Government agreed to an exchange of views on a number of questions relating to the practical aspects of the organization of control.

(The Chairman, USSR)

We were entitled to expect that the United States would respond to the good will which we showed with similar good will. Unfortunately, however, the other side responded differently: it put forward more and more new demands, with the obvious intention of diverting the question from the cleared way to agreement into an impassable quagmire of technical discussions and disputes and of haggling for as many inspection and automatic stations as possible. Having met this opposition from the United States, we were compelled, in order to solve the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests, to raise the question of transferring the negotiations from the United States to the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva.

During the negotiations in New York and Washington, and in our Committee, since nothing has yet changed here either, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have been trying to make a bargaining point out of a question on which we considered, judging from their earlier statements, that we had agreed. Apparently they take the line that, since the Soviet Union has agreed to their own proposal for two to three inspections, they may as well try now to get a few more inspections. At our meeting on 12 February Mr. Godber stated that, since the Soviet Union is a very large country, it would not embarrass it to accept a few more and raise the figure of inspections (ENDC/PV.96, pp.31,32). But this kind of argument can be used only by those who are concerned not about the fate of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, but about other matters which have nothing to do with the task of verifying compliance with such an agreement.

Now let us take up the question of automatic seismic stations. Here again, we get the impression that the United States and the United Kingdom are trying to complicate the negotiations by putting forward demands for the largest possible number of these stations. We proposed that automatic seismic stations should be installed, not because they are necessary for control over the cessation of tests, but solely to facilitate the achievement of an agreement.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Before the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to agree that automatic seismic stations should be visited by international personnel, the representatives of the Western Powers showed no great interest in these stations. They talked a lot about their doubts regarding the usefulness of setting up such stations, their efficiency, the conditions of their operation, and so forth. But when the Soviet Union agreed that international personnel should bring the sealed instruments to automatic stations on the territory of the Soviet Union and should bring them back to the international centre - that is to say, when there opened up possibilities of sending foreign personnel into the Soviet Union - the Western Powers abruptly changed their attitude towards these stations. They are now insisting on the installation of the greatest possible number of automatic seismic stations in the Soviet Union. The legitimate question arises: what purpose is served by these demands? In any case, the purpose is not that of control over an agreement on the cessation of tests.

The two to three inspections a year and the three automatic seismic stations which we propose represent a substantial addition to the already adequate control which can be organized on the basis of the use of existing national systems, as has been proposed in particular in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/28). Such control would fully satisfy us. If one looks at things objectively, this proposition also fair to the Western Powers. But we are faced with the Western Powers' rigid policy and their obvious unwillingness to abandon demands which are preventing progress towards agreement.

The position of the Western Powers, if we consider its actual gist, can be summed up as follows: "Accept our new conditions, agree to increase the number of inspections and automatic stations, or else there will be no agreement". And apparently in order to reinforce the gravity of this demand, which is essentially an ultimatum, the United States has proceeded to conduct nuclear

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tests in violation of resolution 1762(XVII) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/63). Statements are being made in the United States - and echoes of them can be heard here in the statements of the United States delegation - that this is being done in order to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. Is this not a policy of "all or nothing", in its most expressive and provocative form? Attempts to represent this United States position here in the negotiations as flexible cannot delude anyone. But it is those who believe that they can achieve their purpose in this way who are profoundly deluding themselves. The language of ultimatums and attempts to exert pressure on the Soviet Union will lead to no good. Unreasonable haggling sometimes leads to a situation in which those who ask too high a price lose everything.

In order to mislead the members of the Committee and the world, the United States and United Kingdom representatives are asserting that their position on control over the cessation of nuclear tests, and particularly on the number of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations, is based on scientific reasons. These assertions by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in no way correspond to the facts. As we have said before, the position of the Western Powers is dictated by reasons which are very far removed from science.

To what I have already said on this subject, I can add the following. The representatives of the United States speak of an equal inspection quota and an equal number of automatic seismic stations for their own territory and for the territory of the Soviet Union. It is well known, however, that the territory of the United States is many times more seismic than the territory of the Soviet Union. Every year considerably more seismic phenomena occur in the United States which, according to the position of the United States delegation, would call for on-site inspection. This was pointed out, for example, by the United States scientist Dr. Latter, who is in the service of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in his report to Congress on 19 April 1960. It can easily be seen that, if we were to follow the position taken by the United States representatives and make the number of inspections depend on the number of unidentified events, a greater number of inspections would have to be carried out

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in the United States than in the Soviet Union. But the United States does not propose that. As you see, in regard to the quota it refers to science, but acts according to what is to the advantage of the United States. It acts on the basis of purely political positions.

At the meeting on 18 February 1963, Mr. Foster in fact confirmed that the United States demands in regard to an inspection quota are in no way determined by scientific reasons, although he referred to a scientific approach. Just look at what - save the mark! - scientific arguments were put forward to justify the United States position in this matter:

"Three would not only be far too small a proportion: it would be patently inadequate even if the unidentified earth tremors were many fewer than our scientists say." (ENDC/PV.99, p.21)

In other words, whatever the conclusions of the scientists may be, however small the number of unidentified and suspicious events may be, the figure of three inspections a year does not suit the United States. That is the gist of the matter; that is where the dog lies buried, as the saying goes, and not in science.

The demand for as great a number of on-site inspections as possible, for as great a number of automatic seismic stations as possible, and for the consequent large number of visits by foreign personnel to the territories of the parties to the treaty, cannot fail to arouse concern. This concern will be particularly intelligible if one considers that the military staffs of the Western countries are trying by all possible means to obtain intelligence information for the preparation of plans to deal blows at the vital centres of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The guarantee of the success of the negotiations lies in solving the basic issues.

Our Committee has been entrusted with the solution of highly-important political problems, which may have exceptionally serious consequences for the development of world history and mankind. This alone implies that a fundamental statesmanlike approach is essential for the success of our work. Only thus can we lay a firm foundation for peace. We appeal to the Western Powers to agree to this.

(The Chairman, USSR)

It cannot be denied that the compromise proposals of the Soviet Union on the cessation of nuclear tests go a long way towards meeting the position of the United States of America and take into account the interests of both sides. Our proposals both on an inspection quota and on the number of automatic seismic stations are fully adequate for exercising additional or, so to speak, reinsured control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, over and above the sufficiently effective control which can be ensured by national means.

What is now required from our partners in the negotiations, and above all from the United States of America, is to take the first constructive step and to reach agreement on the basis of the compromise which it has itself proposed. The Soviet Union is entitled to expect such a step, since in that event the United States would in fact obtain what was originally suggested by itself.

We have heard statements here to the effect that, if agreement could not be reached on the basic issues, we should perhaps turn our attention to other questions, concerned with details of the control system, or discuss them all simultaneously. We consider that we should reach agreement on all outstanding questions, including procedure for taking decisions on the dispatch of inspection teams, on the composition of the inspection teams, on methods of conducting inspections, on the area for verification, and so forth. Nevertheless, many years of negotiation in this regard have taught us all to be cautious of proposals to deal with technical questions while the basic questions remain unsolved. On many occasions in the past, international negotiations have ended in failure because, instead of dealing with the basic questions, the participants began to deal with secondary questions and, of course, got stuck in them.

In the light of that instructive experience it may be said that if no agreement is reached on the basic questions in our negotiations on the cessation of tests, we cannot expect that the discussion of other elements of the control system will bring us closer to the desired goal. On the contrary, we are profoundly convinced that such an approach in the present circumstances, after more than three years of negotiations, can only delay the reaching of agreement. We must guard against the erroneous view that technical studies will help us to solve the problem of the inspection quota and the number of automatic seismic

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stations. If one of the sides wishes to protract the negotiations and expects by haggling to obtain as much as possible for itself to the detriment of the other side, then differences between specialists, particularly when created artificially, may serve as a plausible pretext for placing new obstacles in the path of agreement.

We have already had not a few examples of this in the negotiations on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. I shall adduce one of them. At the meeting between Soviet scientists and their United States and United Kingdom colleagues in November and December 1959 (GEN/DNT/TWG.2/PV.1-21), the Soviet scientists showed the inconsistency of the so-called "new seismic data" which the United States used as a justification for its refusal to agree to the prohibition of underground tests (GEN/DNT/TWG.2/9; GEN/DNT/25). But what was the answer to this in 1959? On 29 December 1959 the then President of the United States of America, Mr. Eisenhower, made a declaration in which, using as a pretext the lack of agreement among the scientists in evaluating data, he said that the United States no longer regarded itself as bound by obligations to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. This was followed by well-known events of which I need not remind you.

The fact I have mentioned is not an isolated one. That is why we cannot agree that now, in the absence of agreement on the basic questions, the Committee should be diverted to discussing other elements of control. To enter into the discussion of various kinds of administrative and technical measures before settling the basic questions would mean losing perspective and evading the main issue.

The line taken by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the negotiations in New York and Washington and here in the Committee must be placed in direct relationship with the resumption of underground nuclear weapon tests by the United States. We have just received information that yesterday two new powerful underground nuclear explosions were carried out in the United States. This, apparently, is an eloquent reply to the following statement made by the Indian representative at our last meeting, from which I shall quote briefly as follows:

(The Chairman, USSR)

"We all know that if once tests start they lead to other tests. Incidentally, I may say that we are grateful that, although there has been one announcement of a test since the beginning of the year, for a time there has been a lull and no tests are being carried out at present. We hope that lull will continue ..." (ENDC/PV.100.P.19)

The answer to this appeal, as you see, was a constructive one. The United States Government issued an open challenge to the peoples whose will was expressed in resolution 1762 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its seventeenth session. The United States has thus assumed a grave responsibility. In conducting nuclear tests on the eve of the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the United States Government could not of course fail to be aware that it was deliberately dealing a blow to the negotiations. In this connexion I should like to remind the Committee of the reaction of the Government of the Soviet Union. The following was stated in the Tass communiqué of 12 February with regard to this challenge:

"The resumption of nuclear tests by the United States throws light on the reason why the United States and other Western Powers did not support the aforementioned resolution of the United Nations General Assembly."

(The reference is to the General Assembly's resolution No. 1762 calling for cessation of all tests as from 1 January 1963.)

"What was hidden has come into the light, and it is now particularly evident by what considerations the United States Government was guided in its approach to the Soviet Government's new proposals on a nuclear test ban, which were expounded in recent messages from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, N.S. Khrushchev, to President Kennedy of the United States."

Further on, the communiqué states:

"Further nuclear explosions began thundering in the United States on the eve of the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. They are bound to complicate the negotiations in Geneva, and will make more difficult the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and indeed the whole work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee." (ENDC/76).

(The Chairman, USSR)

The Soviet Union remains firm in its conviction that, despite the complications created by the actions of the United States at the present time, there are still possibilities for reaching without delay an honest and fair agreement that would satisfy all parties. The Soviet Government has made great efforts and has gone far to meet the Western Powers, having agreed to their proposal on the number of inspections, and has agreed to the installation of three automatic stations. It did so exclusively in order to contribute as much as possible to the creation of favourable conditions for agreement. If the other nuclear Powers participating in the negotiations will also show a constructive approach, it will be possible to reach rapid agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests for all time.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words on the procedure for our future work. In the statements of all representatives in the Committee, great attention has been paid to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. In view of the great interest aroused by this urgent problem, which is ripe for solution, it would seem advisable after the conclusion of the general debate to continue to discuss it in plenary meetings, and not to refer it to the Three-Power Sub-Committee at this stage. In saying this, we base ourselves on the fact that the Sub-Committee has quite recently, in January, discussed this question in New York and Washington. It would therefore be best at this stage to discuss the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests in plenary meetings. This does not mean that the Soviet Union is altogether against the Three-Power Sub-Committee.

With regard to the order in which we should consider other problems which are awaiting their turn for consideration in the Committee and for our decisions, the remarks made by the Soviet delegation in this regard at the last meeting, on 20 February, (ENDC/PV.100,P.41), are still valid.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Before starting my remarks I should like, as others have done, to welcome once more to our midst and to our deliberations our good colleague Mr. Barrington, from whom we confidently expect further contributions to our work.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

My statement this morning will be about the test ban. We have now listened to the preliminary views of most members of this Conference on that subject, and a number of valuable suggestions concerning how the negotiations should move forward have been made and deserve further attention. The Canadian delegation was very glad to hear the exposition which you have just made, Mr. Chairman, of the position of the Soviet Union. I think that was given in response to some requests or suggestions made by some of the representatives of non-aligned countries who have spoken. I would not say that there was anything that you have said which has not been made fairly clear before regarding the position of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the Canadian delegation will study it with great attention, and hopes to find in it some grounds for optimism regarding the progress of the negotiations on this vital subject. We were pleased to hear your final words, at any rate, on that matter, which were that the Soviet Union was still hopeful that an agreement could be reached.

We were also pleased to hear your view that, considering the interest shown by all delegations in the subject of nuclear weapon tests, after the end of the general debate in which we are still engaged discussion on that subject should be carried on in plenary meetings. The Canadian delegation is in favour of that approach. We feel that the debate since the Conference resumed on 12 February shows that there is no room for doubt which subject should engage our main attention and our efforts from this moment until a solution is found. Without exception the representatives of non-aligned countries who have spoken have emphasized that at this stage the negotiation of a test ban is our first responsibility. The Canadian delegation warmly welcomes the interventions of those members of the Committee, and believes that they have both emphasized the vital importance of the test ban and also offered valuable suggestions on how we should proceed with the negotiations. We are also glad that the statements of the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers show that they wish to see the negotiation of an effective test ban agreement treated as the matter of highest priority in the weeks to come. The Canadian delegation would strongly object to any suggestion that this Conference should turn to the discussion of any matter except a test ban until we are assured that the negotiation of this subject has been seriously undertaken and is being conducted in a manner which promises to yield concrete results - and that, in our view, means that there should be direct negotiations on these matters proceeding between the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I have said that the Canadian delegation has been impressed, in the course of our recent debate, by the observations of representatives of the eight non-aligned members of our Committee. I should like briefly to review some of those suggestions which seem to me to merit further consideration.

First I should like to support the statement of the representative of Brazil, who reminded us all on 15 February (ENDC/PV.98, pp.11 et seq.) that this Conference must fulfil the responsibility which has been entrusted to it by the United Nations: to reach, in the near future, an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests. We have an unambiguous mandate from world opinion, expressed most recently in resolution 1762 (XVII), and my colleague from Brazil was right in reminding us of our grave moral responsibility to carry out the task that we have been assigned. All the nations of the world are united in calling for the early conclusion of an agreement to ban tests. At this moment, when the obstacles which have blocked the negotiations on a treaty have been so substantially reduced, world opinion will not understand any slackening in our efforts to resolve this issue, and it is up to us to show that this Conference deserves the trust which has been placed in it.

Like other speakers before me, I wish to pay a special tribute to the representative of the United Arab Republic for the contribution he made to our discussion on 18 February (ENDC/PV.99, pp.9 et seq.). The questions which Mr. Hassan posed on that occasion should stimulate our further negotiations. They clarified for us the substance of the present stage of the negotiations between the nuclear Powers on the test ban issue, and also pointed the way to overcoming what are essentially difficulties of procedure. On the substance of the issue the representative of the United Arab Republic recalled that in the course of several hundred meetings between the three nuclear Powers until November 1961 an encouraging measure of agreement had been reached on a broad range of technical matters upon which the three Powers must now complete negotiations, if a treaty is to be concluded. He suggested that it would be helpful if the agreement achieved in this earlier work could be reaffirmed, or if the two sides could at least make clear the extent to which their respective positions remain the same or the points on which their present positions differ from those they previously took. We have heard a preliminary answer from the United States delegation to that question, and we hope that the Soviet delegation will see fit to amplify what was said this morning in more specific answers to it.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The delegation of the United Arab Republic devoted some attention also to exploring what is the most obvious point of difference between the two sides at the moment, namely the number of annual on-site inspections which would be permitted under a test ban treaty (ibid. p.12). Its analysis of the question showed that the positions adopted by the two sides with respect to numbers, if they were to follow through logically, demand that both sides adopt an attitude of flexibility. On the one side the Soviet Union agrees that three annual inspections represent no threat to its national safety. It is hard to understand why a somewhat larger number would involve any real danger to its legitimate security interests regarding which we have heard certain doubts expressed.

This question of the number of inspections ought to be looked at according to the scale of what is involved. It is a question of relativity, to use a perhaps rather pompous phrase. I have on the wall of my office a map of that great country, the Soviet Union. It is not a secret map; I bought it in a shop. Looking at that map I noted that the Soviet Union extends some 9,000 kilometres from east to west on the sixtieth parallel of latitude, and some 4,000 kilometres from north to south. On my map the distance from east to west is roughly 120 centimetres. I am sorry that I do not have the map here to show my colleagues, for it is said that a graphic illustration is worth any number of words, but on it the extent of the Soviet Union is about the same as from my left shoulder to the end of the fingers of my right hand. As I understand it, the area which is proposed for any one inspection is 800 square kilometres, or an area with a radius of about 15 kilometres. On the same scale, that would represent an area about the same as that of the lead in my pencil. What is the difference in that very big area between the three inspections which represent no danger and the eight inspections called for by the Western Powers? It seems to me that here we are talking in infinitesimals. There is no real, serious difference between them.

The question of the location and number of automatic seismological stations is one which is tied closely to the problems of seismological science, and with which I certainly am not competent to deal. However, the difference between three and the number of seven which Mr. Foster was saying constitutes the present United States suggestion does not seem to me to be a very serious question.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The United States and the United Kingdom have accepted the application of on-site inspection to some proportion of the unidentified events reported by the detection system. That implies that a measure of flexibility exists for the Western side with respect to what this proportion should be. The Canadian delegation welcomes the reaffirmation by Mr. Foster in his speech last Wednesday (ENDC/PV.100, pp.5 et seq.) that the West is in fact prepared to show flexibility in that respect. In the light of those statements, my delegation believes that there is no reason to be discouraged by the present difference of view over numbers, and that those around this table who have emphasized that this question need not present an insuperable obstacle are fully justified.

If that is the case, the immediate problem before this Conference is one of negotiating procedure. Here again the United Arab Republic representative had valuable suggestions to make (ENDC/PV.99, p.15), and he was supported by the representative of India, among others. Quite rightly, the United Arab Republic representative described the present procedural difficulty as similar to the old puzzler: which comes first, the chicken or the egg? (ibid., p.17) . In other words, it is not worth wasting our time to try to find a direct answer to this question.

Now that a firm basis for the negotiations has been established by the exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev (ENDC/73, 74), no one wishes to see the talks bogged down in the discussion of peripheral technical details. But, as a first step to real negotiation, it is of the utmost importance that each side have a clear idea of what the other side is talking about. The representative of the United Arab Republic and others have suggested a variety of ways which would help to get real negotiations under way at the present time.

A suggestion which my delegation believes to deserve particular attention would be for one or other of the nuclear Powers or both of them to submit revised draft treaties - possibly with the number of inspections and automatic stations bracketed - which would set out in some detail their respective positions on all the major elements of the test ban system. The representative of the Soviet Union has emphasized that his Government has made a major concession in accepting the principle of two or three annual on-site inspections. The Canadian delegation

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

is grateful for that step forward. But how is the other side to assess the value of that concession until it has a more precise idea of what the Soviet Union understands these on-site inspections would involve? To get the negotiations going, it is surely not unreasonable to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to tell us his Government's ideas respecting how the inspections will be carried out, who will do the inspecting, what will be the area to be scrutinized, and what are the methods which will set the inspection process in motion - all subjects which he mentioned briefly this morning.

The representative of India made another useful suggestion, and I quote from the verbatim record:

"...if there is difficulty of any kind in reaching an agreed figure in the matter of inspections, then why should not both sides agree that the treaty should contain a clause providing for the reconsideration of the number of on-site inspections after a period of one year, which number should be changed only if both sides agree? That is to say, the treaty is not to be temporary; it will be firm and permanent, and the number of inspections will be there and will not be altered unless both sides agree. The point here is that if science makes further advances in the next year or in the next two years, then change in the number can be made; but there is to be no change or alteration of the treaty, there is to be no setting back of the treaty, the treaty itself is permanent. A change in numbers would be made only if it were agreed upon by both sides."
(ENDC/PV.100, p.17).

The Canadian delegation does not ask that all those questions be submitted for immediate examination by the full membership of the Committee, but we do believe that this Committee has a right to demand the assurance that negotiation on them has been undertaken and undertaken seriously. Once that has been done, as the representative of Sweden pointed out (*ibid.*, p.28), there will be a number of important technical matters to the solution of which individual non-nuclear members of this Conference can no doubt make a useful contribution. Canada would be willing to contribute in any way it can. We are all eager to see that stage reached, and what we ask of the nuclear Powers is that they take the indispensable first step toward serious negotiation in whatever forum and in whatever way they believe offers the best prospect for progress.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In conclusion I feel I can do no better than to quote once more from the speech made by the representative of the United Arab Republic on 18 February. He said:

"... the nuclear parties face their greatest challenge since the beginning of this Conference. They will not be able to convince the world of their sincerity of purpose, they will not be able to silence their detractors who described our whole endeavour, even before it started, as an 'exercise in futility', if they do not find, and quickly, a permanent settlement to the test-ban problem." (ENDC/PV.99, p.17)

The Canadian delegation hopes that that challenge will be taken up at once by the nuclear Powers and that they will begin the final round of decisive negotiation without delay.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I wish only to make a few brief remarks concerning certain of today's statements, and first of all concerning the correctness of the verbatim record. I think that the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov, said that in my statement of 18 February I expressed doubts concerning the good faith of the delegations of the socialist countries. I did not say that, and what I said was as follows:

"Since we do not deny the good faith of our partners, we expect our own good faith also to be accepted, and the use of terms and the imputation of motives which may harm our common effort and discredit our Conference to be avoided in our discussions." (ENDC/PV.99 p.32)

As to the question of atomic submarine bases in Italy, it is hardly necessary for me to assure Mr. Tarabanov that Italy has at heart, at least as much as Bulgaria, the maintenance of peace everywhere and particularly in the Mediterranean. I thank Mr. Tarabanov for his advice not to set up submarine bases in our country. I wish to point out, however, that such questions are, and always will be, decided by the Italian Government in the free exercise of its full sovereignty, in agreement with its allies, and in conformity with Italian policy, which is to guarantee the security of the Italian and all other peoples on a basis of peace and progress. In any case the Italian Government declared recently that, in agreement with its allies, it did not contemplate setting up bases for atomic submarines on its territory, and I should not like this statement to be called in question here.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Moreover, we have in Italy a Parliament which has been freely elected by the people and which expresses the people's will. We have this Parliament, and I hope that we shall always have it. This free Parliament determines our Government's decisions in a democratic manner and provides a pledge that these decisions will always correspond with the basis of our policy, which is, I repeat, to guarantee peace in security, without injuring or threatening anybody.

Altogether, today's remarks by the representative of Bulgaria are very regrettable. They contribute nothing to the progress of our work. They only confirm that certain delegations are unfortunately opposed to a serious and urgent discussion of the question of tests. Thus the delegation of Bulgaria has taken up a position in opposition to the great majority of the delegations present here.

Your own statement, Mr. Chairman, was a very important one, and I listened to it with the greatest interest. At first sight, however, it did not seem to me to indicate a very flexible and open attitude towards the proposals which have been presented here by the delegations of the non-aligned States and to which I drew the Committee's attention in my first statement. Nevertheless, your statement has the merit of answering to the general desire here to go more deeply into the problem of tests. You went right to the heart of the problem, and I thank you. My delegation proposes to study your statement most carefully in order to seek some glimmer of hope of a possible agreement - that glimmer to which I referred in my previous statement.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, I note that you favour the continuation of the discussion on tests here in the plenary Committee after the conclusion of the general debate. I appreciate your position. Nevertheless, I still believe that it would be very useful for the Sub-Committee to meet as soon as possible in order to examine more thoroughly and within a narrower framework the concrete proposals which have been put forward so far here in the plenary Committee by various delegations.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I shall be quite brief, but not so brief that I cannot take time to welcome, and welcome warmly, the return to our Conference of our friend and colleague the representative of Burma, Ambassador James Barrington.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The Chairman in his capacity as representative of the Soviet Union, and the representative of Bulgaria, had some comments to make on the two underground tests which were announced yesterday by the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Those tests were the continuation of a series begun after the abrupt resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1961, and that series has continued except for one brief interruption during the private talks which took place in New York and Washington. It has been stated that those tests make negotiations difficult. I think we should recall that after and during the resumption of tests by the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1961, the United States and the United Kingdom continued to negotiate with the Soviet Union for a test ban treaty. I think the Committee will also remember that this Conference was actually born during a series of nuclear tests, in the sense that the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) and the composition of this Conference were negotiated while a series was in progress.

On the other hand, we have had experience with a moratorium. From 1958 to 1961 the United States and the United Kingdom negotiated in good faith for a nuclear test ban treaty under conditions of a unilateral moratorium. During a long part of the time, at least towards the end of that period, the Soviet Union was preparing actively for a massive resumption of tests. Past experience does not seem to indicate that a moratorium is useful for negotiations. One might be tempted to speculate that there are possibly grounds for thinking that the converse conclusion might be drawn.

What is clear is that the way to stop tests is to achieve a sound test ban treaty. It is our business here to negotiate such a treaty, and in this connexion the statement of the Soviet representative today on negotiations for a test ban treaty is not promising; it is in fact deeply discouraging.

The Soviet representative talked about three things, in the main. First, he talked about reliance on national systems. Now it is clear that there is no issue between us on a system which puts its basic reliance on nationally-manned detection systems. We of the West have moved on this. We called for a network of international systems, internationally manned and staffed. Later we moved from that to willingness to agree to a system of nationally-manned stations under international supervision. Most recently we have agreed to place our reliance on national systems checked by various kinds of instrumentation, and without international supervision. So there is no issue on this, and Mr. Kuznetsov was banging on an open door.

(Mr. Stolle, United States)

We do disagree with his familiar Soviet thesis that national systems can detect and identify all events. Our scientists, scientists on whom we place reliance, tell us that there will be a residue of detected events which cannot be identified by any means other than on-site inspection. That is the second topic on which the Soviet representative spoke, although he spoke only to the question of the number of on-site inspections and automatic stations. I should like to speak now only about on-site inspections and the number of such inspections.

I think we should recall a little history on this. Mr. Kuznetsov went into considerable detail on history this morning; but what, in a nutshell, is the history of the opposing positions on the numbers of on-site inspections? The United States position at the beginning of negotiations was in favour of complete inspection of all unidentified events. We then moved, accepting the quota suggestion put forward by Prime Minister Macmillan, but first formally proposed by Premier Khrushchev, an annual quota of twenty on-site inspections of events over a threshold of 4.75 on a scale of seismic magnitude - a threshold which we assumed to be equivalent to a yield of some eighteen or nineteen kilotons (EMDC/9, pp. 21 et seq.). We then moved to a sliding scale of twelve to twenty on-site inspections a year, still of events above a threshold, and then we dropped the threshold so that our number of inspections was on a sliding scale of twelve to twenty of all events. And now we have come to a figure of eight to ten inspections a year.

What has been the history of the Soviet Union's position during the same period? When it formally put forward the idea of a quota, or rather some time afterwards when it first mentioned a figure for the quota, that figure was two to three on-site inspections a year. And what is its present position? It is two to three on-site inspections a year. I think anyone can see who has moved.

On this figure of two to three on-site inspections a year I am obliged to repeat again that this has never been acceptable to the United States. There was a misunderstanding, a misunderstanding which we regret, but let me read the relevant extracts. In his letter of 19 December Premier Khrushchev wrote to President Kennedy:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"We have noted that on 30 October 1962, in discussions held in New York with Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, your representative, Ambassador Dean, said that in the opinion of the United States Government 2-4 on-site inspections a year in the territory of the Soviet Union would be sufficient." (ENDC/73, p.4)

In direct response to that statement President Kennedy, in a letter of 28 December to Chairman Khrushchev, said:

"With respect to the number of on-site inspections there appears to have been some misunderstanding. Your impression seems to be that Ambassador Dean told Deputy Minister Kuznetsov that the United States might be prepared to accept an annual number of on-site inspections between two and four. Ambassador Dean advises me that the only number which he mentioned in his discussions with Deputy Minister Kuznetsov was a number between eight and ten. This represented a substantial decrease in the request of the United States as we had previously been insisting upon a number between twelve and twenty. I had hoped that the Soviet Union would match this motion on the part of the United States by an equivalent motion in the figure of two or three on-site inspections which it had some time ago indicated it might allow." (ENDC/74, p.2)

After the receipt of this letter and the further exchange of correspondence, the Soviet representatives came to New York and Washington for private discussions. At that time we regretted the misunderstanding which had arisen but which should have been clearly removed by the letter from the President of the United States to Chairman Khrushchev. We made it clear that, to our knowledge, no representative of the United States had ever said that two to four on-site inspections would be adequate for our purposes; and we made it abundantly clear that the United States official position had always been that two to three inspections were not acceptable. There are no grounds at all for Mr. Kuznetsov to claim that that figure of two to three on-site inspections is an agreed figure between the Soviet Union and the United States: it is not. The number of two to three on-site inspections has never been acceptable, and is not acceptable, to the United States.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

After discussing the number of inspections, and after stating that the Soviet Union would never move from that figure of two to three on-site inspections, the Soviet representative went on to talk of the possibility of exploring other issues and of exploring the general integrated system for the verification of a test ban treaty. He said that the Soviet Union cannot negotiate on anything else until the number of on-site inspections and the number of automatic stations are agreed upon.

What does that mean? It means that the Soviet Union says that a number - and primarily the number of on-site inspections - must be agreed upon before anything else is discussed. What does the Soviet Union say about the number? It says that the number of two to three, which it knows is unacceptable to the United States, must be agreed to by the United States before anything else is discussed. I ask the representative of the Soviet Union: is this negotiation?

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I am taking the floor to exercise my right of reply and to thank the Italian representative for the kind remarks he made about my earlier statement. I should simply like to tell him that he was right in saying that he did not know how to interpret the first of my remarks to which he referred. We did not say that the representative of Italy had questioned the wish of the socialist countries that these conversations and negotiations should be successful. We merely drew attention to his assertion that in our comments we were introducing elements which amounted to a denial of the good faith and the wish of the Western countries to achieve results and in particular to reach an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. We then showed that doubts were being cast on this wish and this good faith, not by us but by events, and particularly by events such as those which took place yesterday in the United States, for example.

Secondly, he asserted that our delegation seemed to wish to give advice to the Italian Government or Parliament, or to question their competence to decide Italy's policy. We had no wish to do so, and we never made any such assertion. Our delegation has never called in question the competence of either the Government or the Parliament of Italy to decide Italy's policy. Nor did our delegation try to give any advice. We merely expressed apprehensions similar to those expressed in the international press, reflecting the disquiet which has been aroused in every country, and has been specifically mentioned even in some of the Italian Government's own statements.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

On the contrary, we were very glad to hear these statements, and we thank the Italian Government for giving us the assurance - which indeed the Italian representative has reiterated today - that it does not propose to establish submarine bases in Italy. That is what we were saying. If necessary, I can certainly re-read what I said just now in my statement; but since I have explained myself, I should like to express my gratitude once again for the assurance given us that such measures are not contemplated. We are all very glad indeed to hear this.

With regard to another question, that of attempts to give us lessons in democracy here, I intend to reply to this on another occasion, because this arises rather too often in certain statements, and particularly those of the Italian representative; but I think we shall have an opportunity to speak of this again.

I also thank the Italian representative for his appraisal of my statement. Who are the more constructive, those who notice and comment on activities likely to accelerate the armaments race, or those who are themselves responsible for such activities? There is certainly some difference between the two. But apparently the Italian delegation is better pleased when speeches are made here which are perhaps rather too polite and friendly, and it especially welcomes the possibility of continuing the armaments race. Indeed, it seems to appreciate greatly the position taken by the United States - which, as we have already pointed out, conducted two tests yesterday - and says that the race will certainly go on if we do not accept the conditions that it has laid down for the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

We do not think that to continue our negotiations here, almost within sound of the United States nuclear tests, is conducive to a favourable atmosphere. That is not a position which we particularly appreciate; it is as unconstructive as possible, and gives us no opportunity for any progress. If by any chance this is satisfactory to certain delegations, they are of course free to say so.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): As this is my first appearance at the resumed session of our Conference I do not think I shall be expected to make a statement on the substance of our discussions. However, I should like to express my appreciation to the Chairman and to all the representatives who have extended

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

such a friendly welcome to me today, and also to the representative of India, who was good enough to welcome me at a time when I had not in fact arrived at Geneva.

In re-joining the Committee may I assure the Chairman and all my colleagues that I shall do everything in my power to co-operate with each and every one of them to further the work of this Committee?

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before reading the communiqué, I should like as representative of the Soviet Union to exercise my right of reply and to draw attention to two points.

First, a remark in connexion with the statement made by the United States representative. I understand the difficulties of the United States delegation. What has been said here by the United States representative merely confirms that the United States has long-term plans for conducting nuclear explosions. I do not think that anyone in the Committee would believe that nuclear explosions could be started and conducted without any preparation. Undoubtedly some time was required to prepare for carrying out these explosions. At meetings of the Committee concern has rightly been expressed at the fact that the United States is following a policy which is aimed at continuing nuclear tests, and that the negotiations in Geneva are serving as a kind of screen for diverting the world's attention from this peace-jeopardizing policy. Statements about who violated the moratorium are not new. I merely wish to stress once again that it was not the Soviet Union but the United States which first began testing nuclear weapons. It is not the Soviet Union but the United States which has conducted a considerably larger number of nuclear tests in the atmosphere and underground. On each occasion the Soviet Union was compelled to conduct its tests by way of reply in order to ensure its security.

If one listens to the United States representative, it turns out that it is not the United States that is now exploding nuclear weapons but the Soviet Union, and that the thunderings which are arousing such great anxiety throughout the world are coming not from United States explosions but from Soviet explosions. It is enough to put the question in this way to show the utter flimsiness of the arguments put forward by the United States representative. If the United States of America sincerely desires to put an end to explosions, it must subscribe to

(The Chairman, USSR)

resolution No. 1762 which was adopted by the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations at the recent seventeenth session. This resolution contains a perfectly clear provision, which states that the General Assembly appeals to the nuclear Powers, whether or not agreement is reached, to cease all tests, including underground tests, not later than 1 January 1963. The Soviet Union voted for this resolution; the United States voted against it. The Soviet Union even now appeals to the United States to subscribe to this resolution.

My second remark concerns the number of inspections. We are now repeatedly being told that the official figure of the United States is eight to ten inspections. It is true that the United States is now naming the figure of eight to ten, but it stresses every time that what it names is official. Members of the Committee are aware of how negotiations are conducted and that there are exchanges of views. Our work is not only carried on here at official meetings and when we make speeches, but also during meetings outside this room. We try to use every opportunity to explain our point of view and to listen to the opinions of other delegations and seek ways and means to solve problems. We consider this to be right. For this reason we never refuse to meet or to exchange views.

I have had such meetings with Mr. Dean. In a conversation he had with me on 30 or 31 October last year, Mr. Dean said that the main point on which we differed was that of underground tests. "If the Soviet Union were to agree to a small number, say two to four inspections, I assure you", he said, "that there will be no more differences between us." Of course, that was an unofficial figure. The United States representative is right in that respect; but that was the figure which Mr. Dean named. And you know - I am addressing the United States representative - that there were other instances and other conversations during which the United States suggested the figure of two to three to the Soviet Union. In particular there was a conversation between our scientist, Professor Federov, and Professor Wiesner, also at the end of October 1962, during which the United States interlocuter named the figure of two to three inspections.

I am not speaking about the quotations adduced here in the statements of the United Kingdom representatives, which confirmed the figure of three. Evidently the United Kingdom representative is acting to some extent in co-ordination with the United States; but if there is a difference of opinion between them,

(The Chairman, USSR)

let the United Kingdom representative say that he holds a different opinion in this matter. But the United Kingdom representatives have definitely stated what has been quoted here, namely that all would be well and there would be no differences if the Soviet Union were to accept three inspections. Thus the matter has been really clarified and should not serve as an obstacle to our negotiations on the cessation of tests.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I do not want to go into the details of past conversations; I merely wish to repeat that to our knowledge no official representative of the United States has mentioned a figure of two to four annual inspections as being adequate for inspection of the whole of the territory of the Soviet Union, both seismic and aseismic areas; and I want to confirm that the official position of the United States has never been that two or three annual inspections are adequate, and that therefore that figure is not acceptable. I believe, Mr. Chairman, we have made this completely clear to you.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one-hundred and first plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. V.V. Luznetsov, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of the Soviet Union.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States and Burma.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 25 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

ENDC/PV.101/Corr.1
22 March 1963
ENGLISH only

MAY 11 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

**CORRIGENDUM TO THE
FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST MEETING**

On page 23, the first four lines should read as follows:

"Official representatives believe that, due to improvements in detection methods, the United States can fully rely on its own stations outside Soviet territory ... for the purpose of control over clandestine underground explosions."

